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Current Remedies for the Discriminatory
Effects of Seniority Agreements
Irving Kovarsky*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Seniority as a means of establishing rights and priorities has been

important in most societies, both ancient and modern. Although it has
been suggested that the use of seniority as a standard for promotion and
assignment began in the military,' evidence indicates that segregation

and concepts of superiority were operative in most ancient philosophical
and religious systems. 2 These concepts were carried into modern
religious structures and became visible in the United States even before
the Civil War.3 Since many church leaders extolled the virtue of complete
segregation of the races, this attitude became embodied in many facets
of the American social system. One consequence of this attitude was that
blacks seeking employment and promotion encountered resistance from

both employers and unions. Craft union practices often forced blacks to
accept the least desirable jobs in partially unionized industries and to
concentrate in nonunion plants.4 Since older firms were more likely to be
organized than newer firms, black employment was concentrated in

newer firms and industries in which the failure rate was high. Even in
unionized firms, blacks traditionally were deprived of seniority rights
that could lead to better jobs. Seniority systems, therefore, have had an
*

Professor of Business Administration, University of Iowa. LL.M. 1961, Yale University;

Ph.D. 1956, Iowa University.
1. Mater, The Development and Operation of the Railroad Seniority System, 13 U. CHI. J.
Bus. 387, 391-92 (1940). Many ancient societies used seniority in gearing family leadership and
ownership of property to primogeniture-a system that permitted the eldest male heir to succeed to
the family leadership. Primogeniture was not customary in England prior to the Norman Conquest,
but it was subsequently adopted for military tenure and was gradually extended to the tenure in
socage. F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 37-38 (Cambridge ed. 1961).
In the English feudal system 3 tenancies developed -socage (agriculture), chivalry (military), and
frankalmoign (religious).
2. For example, the notion in Judaism that Jews are God's chosen people has lead to
separation from non-Jews and an inference of Jewish superiority. Other religions have developed
similar ideas.
3. Cf. W. HUDSON, RELIGION IN AMERICA 224 (1965); Miller, Southern White Protestantism
and the Negro, 1869-1965, in THE NEGRO IN THE SOUTH SINCE 1865, at 237-38 (C. Wynes ed.
1965).
4. Rapping, Unionism, Migration, and The Male Nonwhite-White Unemployment
Differential, 32 S. ECON. J. 317, 320 (1966).
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adverse effect on blacks in two ways. First, employers who once refused
to hire blacks permitted white employees to build up years of seniority.
Secondly, employers who hired blacks usually placed them in the least
desirable jobs, permitting whites to gain experience and seniority in
better jobs. In neither instance is there any easy remedy available today
that is compatible with public sentiment, constitutional restrictions, and
fair play for the black community.
Although unions initially employed the seniority system to protect
their members from the antiunion animus of employers, this protection
is no longer as necessary as it once was. The seniority system, however,
continues to perform at least four important functions. First, by
eliminating the opportunity for discrimination, a seniority system helps
to counteract any antiunion bias that is not eliminated by federal
legislation. Secondly, the protection provided by a seniority system is
part of the quid pro quo for employee loyalty. Thirdly, although the
turnover of younger workers may be increased, a seniority system
isually reduces the overall rate of employee turnover, builds morale, and
reduces the number of grievances. Fourthly, a seniority system protects
older workers from the job instability and economic insecurity that
accompanies rapid technological change.
Although seniority rights can be determined by statute,
administrative decision, 5 or custom,6 legislation promoting meaningful
7
collective bargaining has made seniority primarily a contractual matter.
Today, more than 90 percent of collective bargaining agreements
contain seniority clauses, 8 and many agreements expressly condemn
racial discrimination.' The American reverence for freedom of contract,
at least in the past, has tended to discourage judicial interference with
contractually created seniority rights.
This article focuses primarily upon the remedies that can be used to
reconcile the preservation of legitimate objects of a seniority system with
equal treatment for black workers. To provide a historical perspective
5. McClure v. Louisville & N.R.R., 16 Tenn. App. 369, 64 S.W.2d 538 (1933).
6. Aulich v. Craigmyle, 248 Ky. 676, 59 S.W.2d 560 (1933); Webb v. Chicago, R.I. & G.
Ry., 136 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
7. A seniority clause was first included in a collective bargaining contract by the railroad
industry in 1875; railroad companies, however, had used seniority to encourage long-term loyalty
even before unions gained a secure position. See Mitchem, Seniority Clauses In Collective
Bargaining Agreements, 21 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 156, 160 (1949). But see Note, Seniority Rights in
Labor Relations,47 YALE L.J. 73, 74 (1937).
8. Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1-2 (1967).
9. United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (employer
required to bargain with a union over a clause forbidding racial discrimination).
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demonstrating the need for these remedies, the article initially will
describe the availability of relief against discriminatory seniority
agreements under federal labor legislation. The article will then examine

available remedies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
under recent interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. In the
concluding section, possible ways to utilize existing remedies to combat
more effectively the discriminatory effects of seniority agreements will
be explored.

II.

EXPERIENCE UNDER FEDERAL LABOR LEGISLATION PRIOR TO

1964

The early growth of organized labor under the auspices of the
Railway Labor 0 and Wagner" Acts did not produce a corresponding

improvement in prevailing attitudes toward black workers.' 2 In fact,
many unions used their recently acquired collective bargaining power to
improve the lot of their white members at the expense of black workers

in industries subject to their jurisdiction. When black workers
challenged union-negotiated contracts, their claims were generally

rejected on the ground that neither applicable federal law nor state
contract law proscribed intentional private discrimination by unions or
employers. '3
In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad," the United States

Supreme Court rejected this social and legal philosophy by striking
down a discriminatory hiring agreement negotiated by an all-white
railroad union. Predicating the decision upon the public policy embodied
in the Railway Labor Act, the Court said:
So long as [the] union. . . act[s] as the statutory representative of a craft, it cannot
rightly refuse to perform the duty, which is inseparable from the power of
10. Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (codified in scattered sections of titles 15, 18,
28, and 45 U.S.C.).
I. Actof July5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1964)).
12. I. KOVARSKY & W. ALBRECHT, BLACK EMPLOYMENT: THE IMPACT OF RELIGION,
ECONoMIC THEORY, POLITICS, AND LAW 41-50 (1970).
13. Black railroad employees, for example, were unsuccessful in their attempts to end
industry discrimination. In Teague v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 127 F.2d
53 (6th Cir. 1942), the union and the employer modified an existing agreement in order to give white
firemen preference on trains with engines fed by mechanical stokers. The court refused to stop this
practice because private discrimination violated neither state law nor the fifth amendment, which
forbids only government discrimination. Many pre-Teague decisions had considered the need for
flexibility in dealing with industrial strife and changing economic conditions to be sufficient to
justify the power vested in unions and employers to modify existing contractual seniority rights.
E.g.. Shaup v. International Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 223 Ala. 202, 135 So. 327 (1931); Ryan v.
New York Cent. R.R., 267 Mich. 202, 255 N.W. 365 (1934); O'Keefe v. Plumbers Local 473, 277
N.Y. 300, 14 N.E.2d 77, 296 N.Y.S. 505 (1938).
14. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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representation conferred upon it, to represent the entire membership of the craft.
While the statute does not deny to such a bargaining labor organization the right to
determine eligibility to its membership, it does require the union, in collective
bargaining and in making contracts with the carrier, to represent non-union or
minority union members of the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly,
impartially, and in good faith. .... Is

Although the Court required the union to represent all of its members
fairly and equally, it did not specifically condemn the union's exclusion
of blacks from membership.
The Steele requirement of fair representation was subsequently cited
by the Supreme. Court in Syres v. Oil Workers International Union,
Local No. 23,16 which struck down a lower court decision holding that
the negotiation of a discriminatory seniority agreement did not violate
the Taft-Hartley Act.' 7 In Syres, the plaintiffs contended that black
union members were unfairly represented when an agreement was
negotiated with the employer that continued separate lines of seniority
for black and white workers. The Fifth Circuit ruled against the
plaintiffs, holding that the Taft-Hartley Act did not pre-empt state
contract law.' 8 Rejecting the claim that the Taft-Hartley Act was
inapplicable, the Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam decision and
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Steele. Implicit in this
decision is the Court's recognition that a union does not fulfill its duty of
fair representation when it negotiates a discriminatory seniority
agreement.
In theory, the Steele doctrine of fair representation provided an
adequate remedy for racially discriminatory seniority agreements. The
Steele decision, however, did not require unions to admit blacks to
membership or to give any weight to their interests beyond the current
obligation of good faith representation. Moreover, prior to 1964, none of
the agencies charged with administering federal labor legislation had
decertified a union as bargaining representative because of
discriminatory membership practices or the maintenance of segregated
locals. 9 In addition, unions were granted considerable freedom to
15.

Id. at 204.

16. 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam).
17. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 29
U.S.C.).
18. Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).
19. See Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964) (Board held, without citing Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, that certification could be rescinded because union maintained segregated
locals). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressly prohibits unions from excluding or
classifying individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2(c)(l), (2) (1964).
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manage their internal and external affairs. 2° Under these circumstances,
the remedy that was available in theory proved ineffective in practice
because of the difficulty in proving lack of good faith on the part of
union officials whose primary loyalty was to their white constituents.
This was particularly true in the case of union-negotiated seniority
agreements that made no clear racial distinctions but, nevertheless,
tended to perpetuate the results of past discrimination.
Judicial reluctance to overturn this kind of seniority agreement
under the Taft-Hartley Act is illustrated by the controversial decision in
Whitfield v. Steelworkers Local 2708.21 In Whitfield, black steelworkers
attacked the validity of a collective bargaining agreement that permitted
them to transfer to previously all-white lines of progression on a severely
restricted basis. Before the agreement, the employer, without union
objection, had followed a policy of hiring whites to fill skilled jobs in
Line I while blacks were given unskilled jobs in Line 2. The jobs in each
line of progression were interrelated, and each job provided training for
another job requiring greater skill. Blacks were trained to fill better
unskilled jobs in Line 2, but they were not prepared for skilled jobs in
Line 1. Under the new agreement, black employees could qualify for the
skilled jobs in Line I by passing a test, but most of them failed it. Blacks
who passed the test and moved to better jobs started at the bottom of the
new pay grade, sometimes at lower wages than in the old job, and they
were stripped of departmental seniority upon leaving the old job. Most
black members in the integrated union, composed of 1700 whites and
1300 blacks, had voted against the agreement. Finding for the employer
and union, the district court concluded that the employer could not be
held responsible for the adverse consequences to blacks resulting from
the combination of previous hiring policies and the restrictive transfer
provisions of the new agreement. The court said:
[T]he requirement that promotions be based upon seniority within a Line are
actuated by good faith and prudent business management and are not motivated or
tainted by bad faith or racial discrimination. To eliminate any of these aspects
would decrease efficiency and would result in great harm and disadvantages to both
the Company and its employees, white and Negro.2

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the contract was negotiated in
good faith and that the union fairly represented its black members as
20. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
21. 156 F. Supp. 430 (S.D. Tex. 1957), aff'd, 263 F. 2d 546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
902 (1959).
22. 156 F. Supp. at 435.
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required by Steele and Syres. This holding demonstrates the failure of
the judicial remedy under federal labor legislation to reach many of the
more subtle forms of discrimination against black workers that are
frequently embodied in seniority agreements.
III.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196424 was enacted to attack
racial discrimination by unions and employers. Consequently, Title VI I
provides a more effective remedy against discriminatory seniority
agreements than previous federal labor legislation; the issue in Title VII
cases is the existence of intentional discrimination by either the union or
the employer rather than fair representation by the union. Nevertheless,
decisions under the Taft-Hartley and Railway Labor Acts have provided
some guidance in Title VII cases.
A.

Operative Provisions

Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes
certain unlawful employment practices by employers and labor
organizations. Under this section, an employer may not discriminate
against any individual with respect to his "compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment ....
-25 He is further
prohibited from limiting, segregating, or classifying his employees in any
way that would "deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee ....
-"2 Similarly, unions are prohibited from discriminating
against "any individual" and from limiting, segregating, or classifying
individuals in a discriminatory manner. 27 A union also violates section
703 when it causes or attempts to cause an employer to discriminate. 2 In
case of noncompliance with these provisions, section 706 enables
individual complainants to obtain injunctive relief and back pay in civil
actions.

29

23. Whitfield v. Steelworkers Local 2708, 263 F.2d 546, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1959). In 1970, the
Fifth Circuit reversed its position to comply with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Taylor v.
Armeo Steel Corp., 429 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1970). See also United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F.
Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
25. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
26. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
27. Id. §§ 2000e-2(c)(l), (2).
28. Id. § 2000e-2(c)(3).
29. Id. § 2000e-5(g). The Attorney General also can institute a civil action under Title VII.
Id. § 2000e-6.
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The prohibitions described in section 703 are supported and
modified by section 703(h), which permits "different terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit
system . . . provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate. . .. -30 Section 703(h) substantially codifies
decisions under the Taft-Hartley and Railway Labor Acts approving
seniority clauses that are not currently racially discriminatory. By
preserving nondiscriminatory seniority agreements, this section helped
3
assure passage of Title VII. 1
The guidance provided in section 703(h) is scant; "bona fide" is not
defined, and courts interpreting this section have turned for guidance to
the Taft-Hartley and Railway Labor Act decisions in which the basic
issue was fair representation and good faith bargaining. A seniority
agreement must discriminate against a comparatively large and
identifiable group of employees before it will be classified as a non-bona
fide agreement.3 2 An adverse impact upon a significant number of black
employees must be present, therefore, before intent becomes an issue
under Title VII. Moreover, there is no assurance that discrimination can
be proved even if a large group of employees is negatively affected by a
seniority clause; admittedly, such circumstances would ease the burden
of establishing intentional wrongdoing.
B. JudicialImplementation
The implementation of Title VII provisions to prevent the use and
perpetuation of discriminatory seniority systems is illustrated by a
number of recent cases involving diverse industries and agreements. In
considering these cases, the courts have been forced to analyze the
practical results of seniority agreements since any racial classification
within the agreement would clearly violate Title VI I.
A major case decided under Title VII arose out of the labor
situation in the tobacco industry during the 1960's. In Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 33 the employer segregated and, in practice, paid black
employees less than white employees until 1966. During the pre-1966
period, the company followed a system of departmental seniority that
favored white employees. Prior to 1966, two of the company's
30. Id. § 2000e-2(h) (emphasis added).
3 1. When Congress considered passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, there was considerable
sentiment against it, and, to assure enactment, care was taken to protect the employer relying on
seniority and testing.
32. See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
33. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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departments, prefabrication and stemmery, hired almost entirely black
workers, while the other two, fabrication .and warehouse receivingshipping, hired largely whites. Beginning in 1961, a restricted number of
transfers was made available to blacks in prefabrication. When the
collective bargaining agreement was changed in 1966, black employees
in the prefabrication department were permitted to transfer to the
formerly all-white departments without the previous limitations, but
these transferees were required to begin at the bottom of the new
seniority list. The plaintiff, a black employee who had sought a transfer
to the warehousing department since 1964, brought suit under Title VII
because white employees with less seniority had transferred to the
warehousing department before 1966. The plaintiff specifically sought to
replace a white truck driver assigned to the job prior to 1966. He
contended that the departmental seniority system should be discarded
and a system of plant-wide seniority substituted. Defendants, the
employer and union, asserted that the current collective bargaining
agreement was not discriminatory, that departmental seniority was
appropriate and currently permissible, and that practitioners of racial
discrimination prior to the effective date of Title VII could not be
punished. The district court agreed, in large measure, with the
defendants and refused to prohibit departmental seniority or to penalize
the defendants for previous discriminatory acts except insofar as the
combination of past discrimination and present departmental seniority
resulted in perpetuating the impact of pre-1966 discrimination.
In Title VII cases the remedy is perhaps more important than the
decision. In Quarles, the court ordered the employer to permit qualified
blacks in prefabrication to bid for jobs in other departments as soon as
openings became available, and to date the departmental seniority of
these transferees from the commencement of their employment rather
than from their date of transfer. This decision left the system of
departmental seniority undisturbed. Thus, although the court based its
decision on a finding of current discrimination, it reasoned that it was
not precluded from considering past acts of discrimination when
34
fashioning the remedy.
34. Other courts have used past discrimination to show current intent. An example of this is
found in a steel industry case, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F. Supp. 977 (W. D.N.Y.
1970). Because of intentional discrimination, blacks were concentrated in II of 82 departments, and
seniority was departmental. After 1965, those with the necessary qualifications could move into
another department, but they started at the bottom of the pay and promotion list. The court found a
violation of Title VII because the system tended to lock in black employees. The court recognized
that "'the longer a Negro has worked in the hot and dirty department to which he was admittedly
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In Quarles, the court relied upon Whitfield v. Steelworkers Local
2708, 3- a fair-representation case decided under the Taft-Hartley Act, to
justify its refusal to abolish a departmental seniority system based upon
an employer's decision concerning business necessity. Although the
Quarles and Whitfield courts acknowledged that past discrimination
accounted for the absence of blacks qualified for supervisory jobs, they
refused to saddle the employers with inexperienced employees in these
positions. The Taft-Hartley Act, which provided the basis for the claim
in Whitfield, does not require an employer to bargain with a union over
supervisory positions.3 6 Protection provided by the Civil Rights Act of
1964, however, is not limited to rank-and-file employees; all aggrieved
employees are entitled to redress if either the employer or the union
discriminates. Thus, by not requiring that blacks be placed in
supervisory positions, the court in Quarles failed to take full advantage
of Title VII.
The Quarles and Whitfield decisions differ in their approach to
situations in which qualified black employees bid for better jobs. While
unwilling to phase out departmental seniority completely, the Quarles
court ordered the employer to accept black bids for better jobs on a
plant-wide basis. In Whitfield the court ignored the present impact of
past discrimination upon black employees. A departmental seniority
system of the type facing the court in Quarles, however, cannot always
be justified on the basis of an employer's decision concerning
operational efficiency. In Robinson v. Lorillard Corp. 3 7 another
tobacco industry case brought under Title VII, a federal district court
found that departmental seniority was not essential for efficient
operation. Although Lorillard had discontinued overt racial
discrimination and segregated departments, the court decided that
blacks who were forced to transfer to the bottom of the seniority line
with less pay faced current discrimination. The court concluded that a
bona fide seniority provision must serve a valid business purpose. In
addition, the business purpose must be balanced against the adverse
consequences of perpetuating the effects of past discrimination. Thus,
discriminatorily assigned, the more he has to lose by transfer." Id. at 986. Although the union
argued that the system of promotion was industry-wide, the court concluded that an agreement
resulting in a denial of equal employment opportunity constitutes a violation of Title VI.
Considering past discrimination to be evidence of present intent, the court found the necessary intent
to discriminate.
35. 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959); see notes 21-23 supra and
accompanying text.
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
37. 319 F. Supp. 835 (M.D.N.C. 1970).
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"[i]f the business necessity is somehow vital to the operation of a
particular industry, and . . . it outweighs whatever vestiges of
discriminationare thereby maintained, [the seniority provision] may be
considered bona fide. ' ' 3s This rationale suggests that a court can
invalidate a seniority system for two reasons-absence of a valid
business purpose, or a finding that the interests of black workers are
paramount to the needs of the employer. Quarles and Robinson thus
appear to be irreconcilable in their respective determinations of the
weight that should be given to an employer's decision concerning
business necessity.
A problem similar to the one in Quarles arose in United States v.
Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers,39 a case involving
the Crown Zellerbach paper plant in Louisiana. Until 1966, the
collective bargaining agreement between Crown Zellerbach and the
union had provided for segregated lines of progression for black and
white employees. After 1966, segregation was eliminated but the existing
system of job seniority was retained. Recognizing the importance
attached to efficiency in Whitfield, plaintiffs in Papermakers insisted
that the seniority system was not necessary for efficiency or safety. The
district court, agreeing with plaintiffs' contention, required that the jobbased system be replaced with a plant-wide system, and further said:
Where a seniority system has the effect of perpetuating discrimination, and
concentrating or "telescoping" the effect of past years of discrimination against
Negro employees into the present placement of Negroes in an inferior position for
promotion and other purposes, that present result is prohibited, and a seniority
system which operates to produce that present resu*lt must be replaced with another
system. We agree. . . that present discrimination cannot be justified. . . because
Title VII refers to an effective date and because present discrimination is caused by
conditions in the past."

The court's conclusion that a seniority system that perpetuates past
discrimination and retards fair employment can be reached under Title
VII is in direct conflict with both Whitfield and Quarles. Moreover, the
court in Papermakersreached its decision even though training received
in one job was necessary for the next job level within that line of
progression. The employer's increased costs were not expressly
considered, but any additional expense would not be formidable. In any
event, industry-wide existence of the same discriminatory pattern would
result in the added cost being passed on to the public.
38. Id.at841.
39. 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968), affd, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 919 (1970). See also Mondy v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 271 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. La. 1967),
Otis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
rev'd sub. noma.
40. 282 F. Supp. at 44-45.
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When past discrimination has current impact, there is ample reason
to substitute plant-wide for job or departmental seniority. It would be
difficult to find an industry, plant, agreement, or past practice that has
not discriminated against blacks. Since discrimination has been
commonplace, Papermakers appears to establish the rule that any
seniority system that impedes black progress violates Title VII. This
rationale could be applied to all seniority systems that cannot be justified
by the need for plant efficiency. In Papermakers the Fifth Circuit
rejected the so-called status quo concept that permits an employer to
meet his responsibility under Title VII merely by satisfying current legal
requirements. According to the court, black employees cannot be
permanently locked into traditional jobs because of past discrimination.
Under this theory, there is no possible neutral or fair system that
preserves the status quo. Although the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) 41 does not condemn every seniority system as
discriminatory-to do so would contradict the will of
Congress-Papermakers comes close to this position.
In another paper industry case, Long v. Georgia Kraft Co.,42 blacks
had been restricted to two out of eleven lines of progression. In many
instances, jobs within the lines of progression prepared workmen for
more demanding jobs. Although the restrictions had been lifted, the
court ruled that the seniority system violated Title VII because white
employees with less plant seniority than blacks occupied jobs in the more
favorable lines of progression. Citing Papermakers, the court decided
that the proper remedy was to substitute plant-wide seniority for the
existing system. The court based its holding upon a finding that the
system contributed to efficiency but was not "necessitated by either
efficiency or safety considerations. 41 3 This novel position indicates that
a contribution to efficiency will not protect the employer unless he can
prove that the system in use is necessary to maintain efficient operation.
When promotion to another job or department results in loss of
seniority, and bumping rights in the old job are not retained, 44 black
employees are usually unwilling to bid for reassignment, particularly if
layoffs are frequent. Consequently, past discrimination encourages
41.
42.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(4) (1964) (establishing EEOC).
62 CCH Lab. Cas. 6712 (N.D. Ga. 1970).

43.

Id. at 6717.

44. Bumping is an almost universally recognized right of senior employees, under a plantwide seniority system, to displace junior employees in order to avoid their own layoff. The right is
conditioned upon the ability of the senior employee to perform the work of the junior and may be
negated by contract language denying the right. Darin & Armstrong, 13 Lab. Arb. 843 (1950)

(Platt, Arbitrator).
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maintenance of the status quo when the employer and union continue to

contract for departmental seniority. A court order that sanctions this
result short-circuits the public policy of fair employment. Treatment of

seniority following promotion can take several forms. First, the most
restrictive plan is to begin seniority on the new job and end it on the old
job.4 5 Secondly, the employee may continue to accumulate seniority on
the old job and accumulate seniority on the new job from the date of
assignment. Thirdly, the employee may carry over accumulated seniority
into the new job, but without bumping rights. Fourthly, he may be

permitted to continue his seniority into the new job and maintain it on
the old job-a method preferred by black employees with some
longevity.
Although past discrimination alone will not support a finding of
current discrimination, section 703(h) is broad enough to reach current
employer and union practices that perpetuate the results of past
discrimination. 6 Therefore, if blacks are discouraged from taking
advantage of their longevity in the firm by the present seniority system,
an inference of discrimination is proper. The fact that departmental
seniority is necessary for efficient operation may overcome the
presumption of guilt, but the burden of proof on this issue should be
shifted to the employer and union. If sufficient evidence is not
forthcoming, the defendants should be held responsible under Title VI 1.11
45. Today, most agreements provide for a loss of past seniority when an employee moves to
another job or department, often without bumping rights. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS, SENIORITY IN PROMOTION
AND TRANSFER PROVISIONS 32-33 (Bull. No. 1425-1I, 1970).

46. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 39 U.S.L.W. 4317 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1971); United States v.
Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); United States v. Sheet
Metal Workers Local 36,416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
47. Other practices governing hiring and promotion also have been found to violate Title VII.
Construction unions have used nepotistical membership rules and union hiring halls to exclude and
prevent the advancement of blacks. In Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047
(5th Cir. 1969), the union by-laws and constitution required applicants for membership to be related
to a member. The court found the requirement illegal, recognizing that black entrance to the
construction trades is prevented when an all-white union limits its membership to relatives. Other
courts have found similar membership requirements illegal. Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 70
L.R.R.M. 3043 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Plumbers Local 2, 152 N.L.R.B. 114 (1965), affd, 62 L.R.R.M.
2211 (2d Cir. 1966). These rulings appear to invalidate all membership requirements that perpetuate
past discrimination. In United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.
1969), the collective bargaining agreement provided for union operation of a hiring hall, with
referrals based on the experience of the applicant as a sheet metal worker. Since blacks were barred
from the union before 1966, the hiring hall agreement was held to violate Title VII.
Nondiscriminatory membership was considered irrelevant since the agreement kept blacks on the
bottom of the placement list. This case demonstrates the broad principle that unions guilty of past
discrimination cannot contract for a seniority clause that perpetuates discrimination through the
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The presumption also may be overcome by an employer who
demonstrates his good faith by shifting blacks to jobs without loss of
pay or seniority. In addition, the employer can show his good faith by
training senior black employees for better jobs. 8
C.

Remaining Problems in ParticularIndustries

Despite some success under Title VII in preventing the perpetuation
of past discrimination in certain industries, similar problems remain
unresolved in other industries. Resolution of these problems will require
a broad range of governmental action in addition to more extensive
judicial implementation of Title VI I.
Take the automobile industry, for example. Before passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, blacks were concentrated in the least desirable
jobs and departments-foundry work, spraying, sanding, and unskilled
labor. 4 Despite the liberal tradition and policies of the UAW, prior
seniority agreements discriminated against blacks;5 those eligible for
promotion remained in "black" jobs and in narrow lines of seniority
that prevented upward movement. During World War II, General
Motors, Ford, Packard, Hudson, the UAW, and others agreed to an
industry-wide seniority system that encouraged employee mobility into
jobs essential to the war effort.-" Blacks benefited by this change in
policy, but this advantage was short-lived.5 2 Southern assembly
plants maintained segregated lines of seniority until 1961 without
condemnation by the UAW, 3 and even today blacks throughout the
industry are concentrated in foundries and maintenance departments.5
Current seniority provisions covering automobile workers are more
favorable to black progress than those established in the paper industry,
but without plant-wide seniority black advancement will continue to be
slow.
mechanism of the hiring hall. See also Lewis v. Ironworkers Local 86, 2 F.E.P. Cas. 252 (Wash.
Super. Ct. 1969).
48. It has been held that failure to train black employees for better jobs is evidence of
discrimination. United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969). Contra, United
States v. H.K. Porter Co., 70 L.R.R.M. 2131 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
49. Bailer, The Automobile Unions and Negro Labor. 59 POL. SCI. Q. 548, 549 (1944).
50. Id. at 562-66.
51. Ziskind, Union Agreements:A War Weapon, lOU. Cm. L. REv. I, 13 & n. 35 (1943).
52. Summary-Seniority in the Automobile Industry, 59 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 463-64
(1944).
53. H. NORTHRUP, THE NEGRO IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 9 (The Racial Policies of

American Industry Rep. No. I, 1968) (seniority in the automobile industry was negotiated on a
local basis).
54.

Id. at 49.
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In the defense industries, which since World War I I have stimulated
the national economy because of increased expenditures for research and
development, 55 the percentage of hourly employees has decreased
substantially while the percentage of engineers and scientists has
multiplied.5" This increase has largely resulted from the development of
more sophisticated products by defense and aerospace firms which
employ large numbers of engineers and scientists.17 Since few blacks
possess the educational qualifications for these positions, promotion in
these industries has been impeded. On the whole, however, black
advancement in aerospace has not been restricted. In fact, lines of
progression tend to be broad, possibly favoring the qualified black.
During periodic layoffs, however, black employees in aerospace are hard
hit by bumping.5 8
Another kind of seniority problem is found in the tire
manufacturing industry in which most blacks hold production jobs that
have been disappearing because of technological change. 59 The United
Rubber Workers Union, whose locals have been more influential than
the international, represents most of the workers. Although the
international officially favors fair employment, the locals are often
opposed.10 Prior to World War II, blacks were restricted to laboring and
custodial jobs or confined to the compounding rooms, with separate
lines of seniority."' After the war, locals pushed for plant seniority in
place of departmental seniority to increase the job opportunities
available to white members. 2 If fair employment legislation had been in
effect at that time, however, locals might have been less willing to push
for plant-wide seniority. Notwithstanding contracts calling for plantwide seniority, some departments remained segregated, 3 and, even now,
55. Between 1950 and 1965, research and development expenditures of the Department of
Defense increased from $652 million to $7 billion. Spending for space research increased from $54
million to $5 billion during this period. S. MELMAN, OUR DEPLETED SOCIETY 77 (1965).
56. Fulton, Employment Impact of Changing Defense Programs,87 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
508, 513 (1964).
57.

U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK AND
table 16, at 37 (Bull.

CHANGING OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE IN ELECTRONICS MANUFACTURING,

No. 1363, 1963).
58. Id. at 34.
59. H. NORTHRUP, THE NEGRO IN THE RUBBER TIRE INDUSTRY 12-14 (The Racial Policies of
American Industry Rep. No. 6, 1969).
60. Id. at 22-23. See also Local 12, Rubber Workers, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
61. H. NORTHRUP, supra note 59, at 34-35.
62. Id. at 47-49.
63. United Rubber Workers Union, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964).

1971]

SENIORITY DISCRIMINATION

few blacks can be found in upper and middle management ranks.6 4
Similarly, craftsmen hold fifteen percent of all jobs in the industry, but
blacks fill only 2.8 percent of these jobs.65 It appears that management
and organized labor are each partly responsible for the lack of black
advancement. The problem for the EEOC and the courts in this situation
is one of ending intentional discrimination rather than changing the
seniority system. To quickly and effectively abolish discrimination in the
tire industry, unions could be decertified by the NLRB 6s and government
contracts could be cancelled by the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance (OFCC).17 Admittedly, the track record of the OFCC is
poor, since it has not utilized its power to cancel contracts held by
employers who continue to discriminate. 8
In the petroleum industry, unionization has been limited to those
employed in refining, with power concentrated at the local level.6 9
Although segregated lines of seniority officially ended by 1960, few
blacks have moved upward because management has required employees
to have high school degrees and satisfactory performance on tests for
advancement. 70 In addition, black advancement has been restricted
because management has favored departmental seniority and white
locals have continued to discriminate. 7' It seems that a decision similar
to Papermakerswill be necessary to eliminate the adverse impact of the
seniority system in petroleum.
Research is a key factor in the chemical industry, and many jobs are
professional and skilled in nature. 2 Lack of education, failure to bid for
open jobs, and technological change have prevented blacks from
advancing rapidly. 73 Seniority in the chemical industry tends to be
accumulated departmentally for promotion and plant-wide for layoff,
permitting bumping, which injures many black employees. An attempt
has been made by employers and unions to minimize the adverse impact
64. The employers are primarily responsible for this since the union does not bargain for
management employees.
65. H. NORTHRUP, supra note 59, at 70-78.
66. Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
67. See41C.F.R. §§ 60-1.1 to-l.4 (1971).

68. R.

NATHAN, JOBS AND CIVIL RIGHTS

(Clearing Pub. No. 16, 1969); Jones, The Bugaboo

of Employment Quotas, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 341, 398.
69. C. KING & H. RISHER, THE NEGRO IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 16-23 (The Racial
Policies of American Industry Rep. No. 5, 1969).
70. Id. at 36-38. Similar requirements were successfully attacked under Title VII in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971).
71. Id. at 90-91.
72. W. QUAY, THE NEGRO IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 1-10 (The Racial Policies of
American Industry Rep. No. 7, 1969).
73. Id. at 64-67.
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of seniority upon blacks, but little success has been achieved.
Complaints under Title VII have not yet questioned this split system of
seniority; but since it has an adverse effect on black employees, a court
could reasonably find that it violates Title VII if there is insufficient
evidence of business necessity.
IV.

THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1866
A black employee who is denied equal employment opportunities
may be able to seek protection under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as well
as under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The 1866 Act was
largely forgotten after the Civil Rights Cases,74 in which the Supreme
Court decided that private discrimination did not violate the thirteenth
amendment, which forbids slavery, or the fourteenth amendment, which
prohibits state discrimination. In 1968, however, the scope of the
thirteenth amendment and the 1866 Act was reconsidered in the case of
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,7 5 in which a real estate developer refused
to sell a home to blacks and was thereafter sued under the forgotten Civil
Rights Act. Section 2 of the Act provides:
All citizens . . . shall have the same right, in every State. .. as is enjoyed by
white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property."

The constitutional issue raised in Jones was whether the thirteenth
amendment is sufficiently broad to support the 1866 legislation.
Upholding the constitutionality of the 1866 Act as a proper exercise of
congressional power, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's
refusal to sell a home to the plaintiffs was a badge of servitude forbidden
by the thirteenth amendment.
The decision in Jones is bound to unleash a fresh flurry of activity in
the civil rights arena. Although the contractual rights protected in
section 2 of the 1866 legislation pertain to property, section 1 provides:
All persons . . . shall have the same right in every State . . .to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to enjoy the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens. ....
77

Sections 1 and 2 are substantially complementary. Yet the right to
contract spelled out in section I is not limited to "real and personal
74.
75.
76.
77.

109 U.S. 3 (1883).
392 U.S. 409 (1968).
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
Id. § 1981.
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property," and it could be interpreted as a necessary protection for
blacks in their contractual relations with employers. Several recent
decisions, relying on Jones, have adopted this rationale in holding that
section 1 of the 1866 legislation reaches private discrimination in
employment.7
It seems safe to assume that section 1 of the 1866 Act has not been
superseded by Title VI I even though the more recent legislation provides
a more comprehensive system of relief. This assumption is supported by
the Seventh Circuit's holding in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works" that,
although Title VI I may have modified an aggrieved person's right to sue
directly under section 1, it neither expressly nor impliedly overruled the
1866 Act. The court's conclusion is reasonable because, when the 1964
legislation was drafted, Congress was apparently unaware of the 1866
Act's potential use. In this context, an attempt to ascertain
congressional intent would be unproductive. A more pertinent approach
would be to weigh the need for the cumulative remedy provided by the
earlier legislation. This approach would not undermine the validity of
the 1866 Act since the coexistence of different remedies for private
discrimination is not without precedent. 8'
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

While the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement is a
private matter between a union and an employer, the public is interested
in minimizing industrial strife and preventing agreements that
contravene public policy. One of the agencies responsible for
implementing the public interest in collective bargaining is the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). Section 7(d)(3) of the
Taft-Hartley Act provides for notification of the FMCS 30 days before
78. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970); Clark v. American
Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1969).
79. 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970) (aggrieved person may sue directly under § 1981 if he pleads
reasonable excuse for failure to exhaust EEOC remedies under Title VI I); accord, Washington v.
Baugh Constr. Co,, 313 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Wash. 1969) (jurisdictional prerequisites of Title VII
inapplicable to suit under § 198 1).
80. In James v. Ogilvie, 310 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Il. 1970), the impact of Title VII upon the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 was considered. The court found nothing in Title VII to preclude
application of the 1871 legislation but felt that an injunction was unwarranted because there had
been no showing that the state remedy was inadequate.
81. The means to end discrimination have constantly increased since 1942. When a
discriminatory seniority system is part of a collective bargaining agreement, for example, both
§ 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), and Title VII can be used. Relief also is
available under state fair employment law, and the federal government can require government
contractors to follow Exec. Order 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965).
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the expiration of an agreement if its services are desired in the
negotiation of a new agreement.82 Although the primary responsibility of
the FMCS is to help parties who are experiencing difficulty negotiating a
new agreement, it occasionally helps resolve disputes arising out of an
existing agreement.
The best place to minimize the impact of an unfair seniority
agreement is at the bargaining table with the aid of a representative of
the FMCS. Although a more active role for the FMCS may require
express congressional authorization, s without this outside assistance,
progress for blacks will be slower. Union leaders, who function like
politicans, are reluctant to urge positive action that white members will
dislike. Employers also are unwilling to take action that will affect
employee morale. In addition, employers fear that the integration of
departments and jobs will lead to slowdown and inefficiency. Although
policy of the FMCS is not to intervene or make suggestions when the
employer and union agree, FMCS leadership is necessary in employerunion negotiations on seniority provisions. If allowed to participate, the
FMCS conciliator could assess the probable impact of a seniority clause
upon black employees and either recommend change 4 or notify the
EEOC, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, or the
OFCC. It is axiomatic that improved liaison among federal agencies
dealing with civil rights issues can only prove beneficial. Although
employers and unions may balk at inspection and resent "spying," their
reaction should not be sufficiently adverse to outweigh the obvious merit
of FMCS participation. Since employers and unions claim that they
support and follow fair employment policies, it would be politically
unwise for them to object to inspections and suggestions that are
intended to implement these goals.
Another way in which the federal government can effectuate fair
82.

29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(3) (1964).

83. The intervention of third parties in the collective bargaining process to prevent the
adoption of discriminatory seniority provisions may be prohibited by § 9(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964), which requires an employer to bargain exclusively with
properly designated employee representatives. This result is indicated by the decision in Hotel
Employer's Ass'n, 47 Lab. Arb. 873 (1966) (R. Burns, Arbitrator), in which an agreement between
employers and nonunion, civil rights groups for the stated purpose of implementing a policy of
"equal employment opportunity" was struck down as an unlawful collective bargaining agreement
because it varied terms and conditions of employment of some employees in the unit for which a
union was the designated bargaining representative. Although the holding in this case is not
necessarily applicable to FMCS participation in the collective bargaining process, it indicates a
need for express congressional authorization of such participation.
84. Since FMCS activity has reached a new high this approach might prove worthwhile.
Summary of Developments, 74 CCH LAB. L. REP. 313 (1970).
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employment policy is to scrutinize the impact of seniority clauses upon
blacks employed by government contractors. Executive Order 11,2461.
prohibits employment discrimination by government contractors and
subcontractors. To implement this order, the OFCC has compiled rules
that are applicable to prime contractors and subcontractors who employ
more than 50 people and who hold contracts exceeding 50,000 dollars.
These rules label unfair seniority systems as contract violations and
require employers to take affirmative action to hire and upgrade
blacks. 6 Moreover, government contracts cannot be awarded or
continued when promotion, training, or seniority systems are
discriminatory.8 7 Despite the OFCC's poor enforcement record,
government agencies that award contracts to private employers may be
in the best position to promote fair seniority clauses because they are not
usually hampered by the same rules of evidence and procedure that
restrict courts. 88
In 1968, after reviewing the Papermakers decision to determine
whether additional measures were necessary to insure satisfactory
compliance with Executive Order 11,246, the OFCC issued a
memorandum containing additional instructions to its contract
compliance officers. This memorandum acknowledged that seniority
clauses are the primary responsibility of employers and unions, but
recognized an OFCC obligation to challenge unfair seniority provisions.
Although OFCC officials have instructed agency representatives to
check the discriminatory aspects of collective bargaining agreements, the
FMCS continues to pursue a hands-off policy. This does not mean,
however, that the OFCC has done more than the FMCS to abolish
discriminatory seniority clauses. Both have failed to realize their
potential because of their inability to coordinate policy and practice.
One means by which employers and unions may avoid a charge of
unfairness is the negotiation of a new agreement providing for plant or
company-wide seniority in place of job or departmental seniority. In the
absence of unusual circumstances, such as would be present if the
agreement caused a reduction in the pay of black workers, federal
agencies and the courts should accept it as an honest attempt to rectify
past injustice. A black employee is more likely to accept a new
assignment when seniority continues to run or when backward bumping
85. 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965) (announcing a policy of equal employment opportunity).
86. The rules of the OFCC, which are based on Exec. Order No. 10,925,3 C.F.R.448 (Supp.
1963), were made effective on January 30, 1970. See 35 Fed. Reg. 2586-90 (1970).
87. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448, 449 (Supp. 1963).
88. See materials cited note 68 supra.
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rights are contractually reserved. It may be unwise, however, to permit
seniority to be carried over to a new assignment if employees already on
a job or in a department will suffer.89 Consequently, it may be reasonable
for courts to approve agreements that permit bumping without a
transfer of seniority while rejecting agreements in which seniority is lost
and bumping is prohibited. Moreover, an employer who is reluctant to
grant plant-wide seniority unless employees who seek transfers are
required to prove their ability to perform the requested job could
contract for a reasonable trial period-30 to 90 days, for example, with
full seniority restored after the trial period-that would be sustained
under Title VIIP'
Employers have blamed unions for the perpetuation of the caste
system in industry. Blacks, on the other hand, have justifiably insisted
that their lack of skill and experience is the result of both employer and
union discrimination. Clearly, both are at fault and must share the
responsibility equally.

89. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F. Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y. 1970). The broad
seniority unit could be damaging to newly hired black employees, particularly since many firms and
unions that followed discriminatory practices in the past have only recently begun to hire on a fair
basis.
90. See United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 295 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ala. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds. 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969).

